We will deal here with Thomas Hobbes's dramatistic theory of social
interaction and of political representation, expounded in Part I of Leviathan. The dramatistic dimension of Hobbes's anthropology is a
crucial link between his theory of the body, of perception and
communication, his theory of personal identity and interaction, and his theory of the body politic, of political
authority, and of political representation and contracts in general.
_______________________________________________________________________________
Keywords: Dramatism, Political theory, Thomas Hobbes, Representation,
Anthropology, Interaction, Authority, Persons.
An audio introduction to the paper:
_____. "How to Make Artificial Persons: Hobbes's
Dramatistic Theory of Interaction and of Political Representation." AI
podcast on José Angel García Landa's paper. Online audio at Academia 24 May 2026.*
https://www.academia.edu/68132891/
2026
The paper is available here:
_____. "How to Make Artificial Persons: Hobbes's
Dramatistic Theory of Interaction and of Political Representation." In
García Landa, Vanity Fea 10 Oct.
2015.*
http://vanityfea.blogspot.com.es/2015/10/hobbess-dramatistic-theory-of.html
2015
DISCONTINUED 2025 – Online at the Internet Archive:
https://web.archive.org/web/20231120172519/https://vanityfea.blogspot.com/2015/10/hobbess-dramatistic-theory-of.html
2025
_____. "How to Make Artificial Persons: Hobbes's
Dramatistic Theory of Interaction and of Political Representation." Ibercampus (Vanity Fea) 13 Oct. 2015.*
http://www.ibercampus.eu/how-to-make-artificial-people-3485.htm
2015
DISCONTINUED 2021 – Online at the Internet Archive:
https://web.archive.org/web/20200808183645/http://www.ibercampus.eu/how-to-make-artificial-people-3485.htm
2021
Online
at Net Sight 20 Jan. 2025.*
https://personal.unizar.es/garciala/publicaciones/howtomakeartificialibercampus.pdf
2025
_____. "How to Make Artificial Persons: Hobbes's
Dramatistic Theory of Interaction and of Political Representation." In
García Lanea, Vanity Fea 10 Oct. 2016.*
https://garciala.blogia.com/2016/101001-how-to-make-artificial-persons-hobbes-s-dramatistic-theory-of-interaction-and-of-political-representation.php
2025
_____. "How to Make Artificial Persons: Hobbes's
Dramatistic Theory of Interaction and of Political Representation." SSRN 26 Jan. 2022.*
http://ssrn.com/abstract=3955767
2021
_____. "How to Make Artificial Persons: Hobbes's
Dramatistic Theory of Interaction and of Political Representation." Academia 14 Jan. 2022.* (2 files)
https://www.academia.edu/68132891/
2022
_____. "How to Make Artificial Persons: Hobbes's
Dramatistic Theory of Interaction and of Political Representation." ResearchGate
17 Feb. 2022.*
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/358660044
2022
_____. "How to Make Artificial Persons: Hobbes's Dramatistic Theory of
Interaction and of Political Representation." Net Sight de José
Angel García Landa 3 Nov. 2022, 20 Jan. 2025.*
http://personal.unizar.es/garciala/publicaciones/howtomakeartificial.html
2022
https://personal.unizar.es/garciala/publicaciones/howtomakeartificialibercampus.pdf
2025
http://personal.unizar.es/garciala/publicaciones/howtomakeartificial.html
2025
_____. "How to Make Artificial Persons: Hobbes's
Dramatistic Theory of Interaction and of Political Representation." In
García Landa, Vanity Fea 6 May
2025.*
https://blogdenotasvanityfea.blogspot.com/2025/05/how-to-make-artificial-persons-hobbess.html
2025
https://x.com/JoseAngelGLanda/status/1919737046333063438
2025
—oOo—
How to Make
Artificial Persons:
Hobbes's
Dramatistic Theory of Interaction and of Political
Representation
José Angel García Landa
Ibercampus
(13
Oct. 2015)
We will deal here with Thomas
Hobbes's dramatistic theory of social interaction and of political
representation, expounded in Part I of Leviathan.
The dramatistic dimension of Hobbes's anthropology is a crucial link
between his theory of the body, of perception and communication, and his theory
of the body politic, of political authority and of representation.
Many aspects of the dramatistic
theory of the self and of communication developed by the
symbolic
interactionists, such as George Herbert Mead and Erving
Goffman, are prefigured in chapter XVI of Part I of Leviathan.
![]()
Thomas
Hobbes's dramatism no doubt owes much to the dramatism of Shakespeare and his
contemporaries, but Hobbes takes it to a new level of explicit reflection,
theorizing the notions of person both in everyday action and with reference to
the conventionally created persons in legal fictions. This is a crucial notion
in his political philosophy, as can be seen in the very notion of the
Leviathan, the State as the giant made of many people, as an
artificial person. Dramatism is central, then, both to Hobbes's
psychology and to his political theory, which are of one piece. Political
representation as an institutionalized role-playing is a cornerstone of
Hobbes's understanding of the political order.
Chap. XVI
Of PERSONS, AUTHORS,
and things Personated
[A Person what] A PERSON, is he whose
words or actions are considered, either as
his own, or as representing the words or
actions of an other man, or of any other thing to whom they are attributed,
whether Truly or by Fiction.
[Persons Naturall, and Artificiall] When
they are considered as his owne, then he is called a Naturall Person: And when they are considered as representing the
woers and actions of an other, then he is a Feigned
or Artificiall person.
[The word Person, whence] The word Person
is latine: instead whereof the Greeks have prósopon,
which signifies the Face, as Persona in latine signifies the disguise, or outward appearance of a man, counterfeited on the Stage; and
somtimes more particularly that part of it, which disguiseth the face, as a
Mask or Visard: And from the Stage, hath been translated to any Representer of
speech and action, as well in
Tribunalls, as Theaters. So that a Person, is the same that an Actor is, both on the Stage and in
common Conversation; and to Personate,
is to Act, or Represent himselfe, or an other; [Note well Hobbes's move here: in being
"natural persons" we are not bypassing the question of
representation: instead, we are representing ourselves, somewhat like
Shakespeare's King Harry on the stage of history, "playing himself",
playing his own role in his own person, as Shakespeare says in the prologue to
Henry V] and he that acteth another, is said to beare his Person, or
act in his name; (in which sence Cicero
useth it where he saies, Unus sustineo
tres
Personas; Mei, Adversarii, & Judicis,
I beare three Persons; my own, my
Adversaries, and the Judges; and is cal[81]led in diverse
occasions, diversly; as a
![]()
Representer, or Representative, a Lieutenant,
a Vicar, an Attorney, a Deputy, a Procurator, an Actor, and the like. [Here Hobbes shows, on the one hand, that the spontaneous
function of representation has given rise to these roles, institutions or
professions, on the other, he also calls attention to our spontaneous theory of
"personation" or representation, understood through common language
and the ordinary social interaction in dealing with these professions, a
pre-theoretical awareness which he brings to consciousness and makes fully
theoretical here, partly by pointing out the historical genesis of the social
function, buried in the etymology of these terms.]
Of Persons Artificiall, some have their words
and actions Owned by those whom they
represent. [Actor, Author,] And then
the Person is the Actor; and he that
owneth his words and actions, is the AUTHOR: In which case the Actor acteth by
Authority. [Cf. here Erving Goffman's hierarchy of
persons, in Forms of Talk: the
principal, the author, and the animator—a slightly different division of roles:
Goffman's 'principal' is the one invested with final authority, and hence
equivalent to Hobbes's 'Author',
e.g. the promoter or sponsor
of a publication, or the producer of a film; the author of a text and its
animators (narrators, 'actors', characters, etc.) are mere ghost writers or
speakers, and thence 'Actors' acting by Authority.] For that which in
speaking of goods and possessions, is called an Owner, and in latine Dominus,
in Greeke Kyrios; speaking of
Actions, is called Author. And as the Right of possession, is called Dominion;
[Authority] so the Right of doing any
Action, is called
AUTHORITY. So that by Authority, is alwayes understood
a Right of doing any act: and done by
Authority, done by Commission, or Licence from him whose right it is. [Covenants
by Authority, bind the Author] From hence it followeth, that when the Actor
maketh a Covenant by Authority, he bindeth thereby the Author, no lesse than if
he had made it himselfe; and no lesse subjecteth him to all the consequences of
the same. And therefore all that hath been said formerly, (Chap. 14.) of the nature of Covenants, between man and man in
their naturall capacity, is true also when they are made by their Actors,
Representers, or Procurators, that have authority from them, so far-forth as is
in their Commission, but no farther.
And therefore he
that maketh a Covenant with the Actor, or Representer, not knowing the
Authority he hath, doth it at his own perill. For no man is obliged by a
Covenant, whereof he is not Author; nor consequently by a Covenant made
against, or beside the Authority he gave.
![]()
When the Actor doth any thing against the Law
of Nature by command of the Author, if he be obliged by former Covenant to obey
him, not he, but the Author breaketh the Law of Nature: for though the Action
be against the Law of Nature; yet it is not his: but contrarily; to refuse to
do it, is against the Law of Nature, that forbiddeth breach of Covenant. [Now Hobbes is
being rather inconsistent—good logic would lead us to see, instead, that the
Law of Nature cannot work this way. Although of course this ethics of action is
often sustained in practice, and not just by Hobbesians, in those political
systems which want to emphasize and leave unquestioned the absolute submission
of persons to other persons, rather than to the law. — J.A.G.L.]
[The Authority is to be shewne] And he
that maketh a Covenant with the Author, by mediation of the Actor, not knowing
what Authority he hath, but onely takes his word; in case such Authority be not
made manifest unto him upon demand, is no longer obliged: For the Covenant made
with the Author, it is not valid, without his Counter-assurance. But if he that
so Covenanteth, knew before hand he was to expect no other assurance, than the
Actors word; then is the Covenant valid; because the Actor in this case maketh
himselfe the Author. And therefore, as when the Authority is evident, the
Covenant obligeth the Author, not the Actor; so when the Authority is feigned,
it obligeth the Actor onely; there being no Author but himselfe.
[Things personated, Inanimate] There are
few things, that are incapable of being represented by Fiction. Inanimate
things, as a Church, an Hospital, a Bridge, may be
Personated by a Rector, Master, or Overseer. But things
Inanimate, cannot be
Authors, nor therefore give Authority to their Actors; Yet
the Actors may have
Authority to procure their mainte[82]nance, given them by
those that are Owners, or Governours of those things. And therefore, such
things cannot be Personated, before there be some state of Civill Government.
![]()
Likewise Children, Fooles, and Mad-men that
have no use of Reason, may be Personated by Guardians, or Curators; but can be
no Authors (during that time) of any action done by them, longer then (when
they shall recover the use of Reason) they shall judge the same reasonable. Yet
during the Folly, he that hath right of governing them, may give Authority to
the Guardian. But this again has no place but in a State Civill, because before
such estate, there is no Dominion of Persons.
[False Gods;] An Idol, or meer
Figment of the brain, may be Personated; as were the Gods of the Heathen; which
by such Officers as the State appointed, were Personated, and held Possessions,
and other Goods, and Rights, which men from time to time dedicated, and
consecrated upon them. But idols cannot be Authors: for an Idol is nothing. The
Authority proceeded from the State: and therefore before introduction to Civill
Government, the Gods of the Heathen could not be Personated.
[The true God] The true God may be
Personated. As he was; first, by Moses;
who governed the Israelites, (that were not his, but Gods people,) not in his
own name, with Hoc dicit Moses; but
in Gods name, with Hoc dicit Dominus.
[As happens
elsewhere in Leviathan, here Hobbes enacts with his unquestioning acceptance of
the British status quo and of the truth of the Christian religion, the
principle he is explaining: that of the state's legitimacy to establish what is
to be publicly believed, or published, and thus his treatise does what it
preaches, Q.E.D.—JAGL] Secondly, by the Son of man, his own Son our
Blessed Saviour Jesus Christ, that
came to reduce the Jewes, and induce all Nations into the Kingdome of his
Father; not as of himselfe, but as sent from his Father. And thirdly, by the
Holy Ghost, or Comforter, speaking, and working in the Apostles: which Holy
Ghost, was a Comforter that came not of himselfe; but was sent, and proceeded
from them both.
[A Multitude of men, how one Person] A
Multitude of men, are made One
Person, when they are by one man, or one Person, Represented; so that it be
done with the consent of every one of that Multitude in particular. For it is
the Unity of the
Represented, that maketh the Person One. And it is the Representer that beareth the
Person, and but one Person: and Unity, cannot otherwise be understood in
Multitude.
[Every one is Author] And because the
Multitude naturally is not One, but Many; they cannot be understood for one;
but many Authors, of every thing their
Representative faith, or doth in their name; Every man
giving their common
Representer, Authority from himselfe in particular; and
owning all the actions the Representer doth, in case they give him Authority
without stint: Otherwise, when they limit him in what, and how farre he shall
represent them, none of them owneth more, than they gave him commission to Act.
[Who'd have
expected Hobbes to theorize the best of possible worlds. In practice,
demagogical manipulation, propaganda,
secret wheels behind wheels, and plain ignorance and irresponsibility on the
part of the electors are the very substance of political representation—
JAGL.]
![]()
[An
Actor may be Many men made One by Plurality of Voyces] And if the
Representative consist of many men, the voyce of the greater number, must be
considered as the voyce of them all. For if the lesser number pronounce (for
example) in the Affirmative, and the greater in the Negative, there will be
Negatives more than [83] enough to destroy the Affirmatives; and thereby the
excesse of Negatives, standing uncontradicted, are the onely voyce the
Representative hath. [Representatives, when the number is even,
unprofitable]. And a Representative of even number, especially when the
number is not great, whereby the contradictory voyces are oftentimes equall, is
therefore oftentimes mute, and uncapable of Action. Yet in some cases
contradictory voyces equall in number, may determine a question; as in
condemning, or absolving, equality of votes, even in that they condemne not, do
absolve; but not on the contrary condemne, in that they absolve not. For when a
Cause is heard; not to condemne, is to absolve: but on the contray, to say that
not absolving, is condemning, is not true. The like it is in a deliberation of
executing presently, or deferring till another time; For when the voyces are
equall, the not decreeing Execution, is a decree of Dilation.
[Negative voyce] Or if the number be
odde, as three, or more (men, or assemblies;) whereof every one has by a
Negative Voice, authority to take away the effect of all the Affirmative Voices
of the rest, this number is no Representative; because by the diversity of Opinions,
and Interests of men, it becomes oftentimes, and in cases of the greatest
consequence, a mute Person, and unapt, as for many things else, so for the
government of a Multitude, especially in time of Warre.
Of Authors there be
two sorts. The first simply so called; which I have before defined to be him,
that owneth the Action of another simply. The second is he, that owneth an
Action, or Covenant of another conditionally; that is to say, he undertaketh to
do it, if the other doth it not, at, or before a certain time. And these
Authors conditionall, are generally called SURETYES, in Latine Fidejussores, and Sponsores; and particularly for Debt, Praedes; and for Appearance before a Judge, or Magistrate, Vades.
[Hobbes does not
contemplate a frequent case of party politics—when all the supposed
"voyces" are really only so many counters to be manipulated by the
leader of the faction to carry out a hidden programme, and the body of
representatives is to decide through a few voices of unequal weight and
uncertain solidity, not by a number of voices of the same weight].
![]()
Hobbes's
examination of political representation is of course central to his political
theory. Political power rests (in Hobbes before Locke or Montesquieu or
Rousseau) on a covenant or social contract. Therefore a theory of the contract
is essential. The King (in his role as the Leviathan) represents the whole
nation, and is therefore an "Artificial Man". Political power in a
commonwealth requires this fundamental act of the delegation of power, or
representation, the capacity to "personate" others, or to act for
them and represent them. No wonder the
political significance of this passage has attracted most of the attention of
commentators.
But there is a more basic
phenomenological fenomenon lying at the basis of this theory of political
representation, one which is of a piece with Hobbes's theory of the world as a
construction, as something actively constituted by the human mind, not merely
passively absorbed or received by it. The very notion of the human subject is
mediated by representation, by this active "playing ourselves".
Perhaps this is the key insight to be found in Hobbes's dramatistic theory of
society and of politics:
"that
a Person, is the same that an Actor is, both on the Stage and in
common Conversation; and to Personate,
is to Act, or Represent himselfe, or an other."
A simple yet profound insight. We
can play
many
parts in the social theatre. That we play ourselves as a matter of fact may be a
common presupposition, but one which often requires clarification. In which
capacity are we acting? As a King, or as a private citizen? In our office as
one more member of the commonwealth, or with our magistrate's hat? We find
here, in nuce, a theory of social
life as role-playing. A person is not simply a person, even if one is trapped
in the body of the actor: a person is a role to be played, and there are rules
to the game of personating others, just as there are limits to one's own
self-personation —at the very least, the mutual limits which these living
theatres set to each other.
—oOo—
![]()
This
dramatistic theory of action and of personality (in which roles are available
as something to assume, either in acting as one's own person, i.e. as a private
individual, or in acting in representation of another person, is then developed
into his theory of political representation.
There are two passages which provide a major key to the whole book, as
is evident from their explanatory allusion to the title. In many books,
especially those with an enigmatic title, a crucial passage reveals, clarifies
or undescores the meaning of the title. Here is Leviathan's explanation of its title, Leviathan, which is also an explanation of a gigantic maneuver of
"personation", a mode of dramatistic interaction. Developing the
reasoning prepared from the very first words of The
Introduction to the volume, Hobbes explains the making of a Gigantic
Artificial Animal, a Leviathan (the one portrayed in the famous frontispice to
the book).
man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated,
that it can make an Artificial
Animal. (...) For by Art is created that great LEVIATHAN
called a COMMON-WEALTH, or STATE, in latine CIVITAS) which is but an
Artificiall Man; though of greater stature and strength than the Naturall, for
whose protectio and defence it was intended; and in which ,the Sovereignty is an Artificiall Soul, as giving life and motion to the
whole body (...)." (81).
And from II.17, "Of Common-wealth", another key
passage. Note that the "personation" whereby the political power is
constituted is a collective action, and that the role of the soul of the
commonwealth may be performed by a monarch (the theory usually associated to
Hobbes as a theorist of absolute monarchy) or by an "assembly", a
body of representatives.
![]()
The Generation of a Common-wealth. The
only way to erect such a Common Power, as may be able to defend them from the
invasion of Forraigners, and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure
them in such sort, as that by their owne industrie, and by the fruites of the
Earth, they may nourish themselves and live contentedly, is, to conferre all
their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may
reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will: which is as much
as to say, to appoint one man, or Assembly of men, to beare their Person; and
every one to owne, and acknowledge himselfe to be Author of whatsoever he that
so beareth their Person, shall Act, or cause to be Acted, in those things which
concerne the Common Peace and Safetie; and therein to submit their Wills, every
one to his Will, and their Judgements, to his Judgement. This is more than
Consent, or Concord; it is a reall Unitie of them all, in one and the same
Person, made by Covenant of every man with every man, in such manner, as if
every man should say to every man, I
Authorise and give up my Right of Governing my selfe, to this Man, or to this
Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and
Authorise all his Actions in like manner. This done, the
![]()
Multitude
so united in one Person, is called a COMMON-WEALTH, in latine CIVITAS.
This is the Generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speake more reverently)
of that Mortall God, our peace and
defence. For by this Authoritie, given him by every particular man in the
Common-Wealth, he hath the use of so much Power and Strength (88) conferred on
him, that by terror thereof, he is inabled to forme the wills of them all, to
Peace at home, and mutuall ayd against their enemies abroad. (The Definition of a Common-wealth). And
in him consisteth the Essence of the Common-wealth; which (to define it.) is One Person, of whose acts a great Multitude,
by mutuall Covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the
Author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall
think expedient, for their Peace and
Common Defence.
And he that carryeth this Person, is called SOVERAIGNE,
and said to have
Soveraigne
Power; and every one besides, his SUBJECT.
(227-28)
It is clear from the above that
both the Sovereign and the Subject are masks or "persons" that are
worn, or dramatistic roles that are assumed, adopted— roles which are
constitutive of political identities and political realities, in a social world
whose dramatistic nature is thereby enhanced and intensified.
—oOo—
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—oOo—
